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Panel 4: Regional Strategic Modernization and Other 
Maritime Developments 
Panel	Prompts	for	Discussion	
1. How	do	India’s	efforts	to	improve	its	maritime	domain	awareness	(MDA)	affect	
Pakistani	maritime	operations?		
2. How	might	the	introduction	of	nuclear	weapons	at	sea	affect	traditional	peacetime	
activities	of	the	Pakistan	Navy,	such	as	port	calls,	flag	showing,	and	logistics	support	
during	disaster	relief	efforts?		
3. How	does	a	sea-based	system	fit	in	with	other	new	systems	in	the	region,	like	the	
potential	for	MIRVing,	BMD,	new	land	and	air	systems	such	as	cruise	missiles,	etc.?		
4. What	is	the	goal	of	strategic	modernization?		How	do	you	expect	the	role	of	the	
Pakistan	navy	to	change	as	a	function	of	taking	nuclear	weapons	to	sea?		Do	you	see	
this	as	a	driver	for	budgetary	or	intra	service	status	change?	
Summary	of	Panel	Discussion	
In	this	session,	panelists	and	participants	took	a	wide-ranging	look	at	emerging	
conventional	technologies	as	well	as	the	challenges	and	implications	of	strategic	
modernization	efforts	by	both	India	and	Pakistan.		
Conventional	Challenges	of	the	21st	Century	
Presenters	discussed	several	important	trends	that	are	emerging	in	the	Indian	Ocean	
Region	that	have	the	potential	to	alter	the	security	dynamics	of	the	subcontinent.	The	
Pakistani	speaker	noted	that	full-scale	naval	warfare	was	almost	unthinkable	in	this	day	
and	age;	rather,	modern	navies	are	primarily	concerned	with	directly	or	indirectly	
influencing	outcomes	on	land	during	a	conflict,	to	include	new	land-attack	cruise	missiles	
being	deployed	by	both	Pakistan	and	India.	New,	relatively	inexpensive	technologies	such	
as	unmanned	aerial	vehicles	could	potentially	bolster	conventionally	weaker	powers	
against	more	capable	adversaries.		
Both	presenters	discussed	non-traditional	forms	of	warfare,	such	as	economic,	cyber,	and	
information	warfare,	and	how	these	trends	may	affect	Pakistan.	Pakistan’s	economic	
dependence	on	sea-borne	trade	is	well	known	and	is	therefore	a	potential	avenue	for	
coercion	by	India.	Even	in	peacetime,	the	need	to	maintain	maritime	domain	awareness	
(MDA)	in	order	to	monitor	fishing	and	other	commercial	vessels	is	a	significant	
undertaking	for	the	Pakistan	Navy.		
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Integrating	the	Elements	of	Strategic	Deterrence		
The	U.S.	panelist	noted	that	effective	deterrence	requires	both	credibility	and	will.	
Credibility	can	be	demonstrated	through	a	state’s	concepts	of	operations	and	regular	
exercises	to	ensure	that	the	force	is	trained	on	that	concept	and	the	necessary	safety,	
security,	and	surety	program	that	undergird	deterrence.	Resilience	in	C2	and	an	ability	to	
reconstitute	national	leadership	also	enhance	the	credibility	of	a	deterrent	threat.		
Declaratory	policies	are	the	primary	vehicle	for	conveying	a	state’s	will	and	the	
circumstances	under	which	nuclear	use	might	be	considered.	While	ambiguity	can	be	
useful	for	instilling	uncertainty	in	an	adversary,	too	much	vagueness	may	suggest	that	
there	is	no	internal	agreement	among	a	state’s	leaders.	For	ambiguity	to	bolster	deterrence,	
the	civilian	and	military	national	leadership	must	
share	a	clear,	concrete	set	of	objectives	and	
understandings	regarding	the	circumstances	under	
which	the	state	would	authorize	nuclear	use.		
The	U.S.	panelist	argued	that	a	search	for	stability	
should	drive	force	structure	decisions	rather	than	
numerical	parity.	He	stated	that	U.S.	forces	are	
designed	such	that	deterrence	ultimately	depends	
not	on	the	capability	to	strike	first,	but	on	the	
assurance	that	the	United	States	will	always	have	the	
capability	to	strike	second.	Pakistani	participants	
suggested	that	India’s	acquisition	of	ballistic	missile	
defense	(BMD)	was	in	part	driving	their	pursuit	of	
SBSD,	though	some	on	the	U.S.	side	questioned	the	
efficacy	of	India’s	BMD	and	expressed	doubts	that	it	would	amount	to	a	true	defensive	
shield	that	would	undercut	Pakistan’s	offensive	capabilities.		
Command	and	Control	Continued:	Technical	and	Political	Elements	
Participants	engaged	in	an	in-depth	discussion	of	the	technical	and	political	requirements	
of	command	and	control	for	strategic	systems,	drawing	on	the	U.S.	experience	to	illuminate	
some	of	the	things	Pakistan	will	need	to	consider	as	it	moves	toward	SBSD.	The	U.S.	
presenter	emphasized	the	need	for	redundancy	and	dispersal	to	make	sure	the	adversary	
believes	they	cannot	guarantee	decapitation	or	preemption	and	that	they	will	be	unable	to	
eliminate	all	possible	sources	of	authorization.	For	the	U.S.	Navy,	this	has	entailed	sending	
messages	during	exercises	via	surface	ships	and	air	assets;	these	practice	transmissions	
would	reach	the	submarine	in	question	a	dozen	times	or	more.	Furthermore,	just	as	
important	as	making	sure	a	launch	order	gets	to	the	right	place	is	creating	a	mechanism	to	
rescind	that	order	if	necessary.		
While	ambiguity	can	be	
useful	for	instilling	
uncertainty	in	an	
adversary,	too	much	
vagueness	may	suggest	
that	there	is	no	internal	
agreement	among	a	
state’s	leaders.		
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These	insights	are	linked	to	critical	questions	of	target	selection.	Because	the	state	is	
dependent	on	multiple	redundant	paths,	it	is	necessary	to	select	targets	that	aren’t	mobile	
or	time-sensitive.	This,	combined	with	the	adversary’s	knowledge	that	they	cannot	prevent	
launch	orders	from	being	transmitted,	can	bolster	deterrence	by	assuring	that	a	second	
strike	on	a	valuable,	stationary	target	is	inevitable.	However,	states	must	also	give	thought	
to	the	necessity	of	war	termination.	Targeting	an	adversary’s	leadership	or	their	C2	will	
make	it	extremely	difficult	to	de-escalate,	pause,	or	terminate	a	conflict	if	their	leadership	is	
in	disarray,	or	you	are	unable	to	communicate	with	them.	
The	Pakistani	participants	acknowledged	the	need	for	redundancy	in	its	NCA;	they	
surmised	that	as	the	exigencies	of	maintaining	a	strategic	triad	become	sharper,	NCA	
reform	would	be	inevitable.	Historically,	the	Army	has	dominated	wartime	decision-
making	in	Pakistan;	however,	future	decision-making	will	likely	need	to	incorporate	inputs	
from	the	Navy	in	order	to	integrate	command	and	control,	determine	target	selection,	and	
manage	other	requirements	of	nuclear	weapons	deployed	at	sea.	The	question	of	who	
could	legitimately	authorize	nuclear	use	if	the	Prime	Minister	was	incapacitated	was	also	
discussed	as	another	element	of	redundancy	and	reconstitution	planning,	with	the	U.S.	
participants	noting	that	the	ability	of	the	U.S.	government	to	reconstitute	a	chain	of	
command	lent	further	credibility	to	its	second	strike;	even	if	U.S.	leadership	were	
decapitated	in	a	splendid	first	strike,	an	adversary	would	be	assured	that	retaliation	was	
inevitable.	 
Arms	Control	Negotiations	as	a	Driver	of	Stability	
All	participants	agreed	that	the	existing	multilateral	institutional	architecture	in	the	region	
is	insufficient	to	address	the	emerging	security	dynamics	identified	in	the	first	panel.	The	
South	Asian	Association	for	Regional	Cooperation	(SAARC),	the	Indian	Ocean	Naval	
Symposium	(IONS),	and	the	Indian	Ocean	Rim	Association	(IORA)	were	judged	to	be	
ineffective	and	lacking	in	implementation	capacity.	The	challenges	to	regional	maritime	
security	are	transnational	and	at	several	levels	of	the	threat	spectrum,	with	no	one	navy	in	
the	region	able	to	exert	control	over	maritime	security.			
In	addition	to	the	need	for	better	multilateral	forums	for	addressing	transnational	
challenges,	India	and	Pakistan	could	potentially	benefit	from	bilateral	arms	control	
negotiations	in	specific	domains	such	as	sea-based	deterrence.	Even	if	a	final	agreement	
could	not	be	reached,	several	U.S.	participants	highlighted	the	importance	of	arms	control	
negotiations	with	the	Soviet	Union	for	enhancing	our	understanding	of	their	capabilities	
and	their	understanding	of	ours.	Conversations	at	the	operational	level	could	help	avoid	
misunderstandings	and	could	enhance	deterrence	by	making	clear	that	both	sides	have	the	
credibility	and	will	needed	to	back	up	their	deterrent	postures.		
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Next Steps 
Over	the	two	days	of	this	dialogue,	the	candid,	insightful	conversations	that	took	place	led	
both	sides	to	recommend	a	follow-up	event	in	which	these	topics	could	be	explored	more	
fully.		
Participants	agreed	that	there	was	scope	to	delve	
further	into	the	many	complexities	of	sea-based	
strategic	deterrence	that	were	discussed	during	
the	four	panels,	such	as	the	technical	and	political	
challenges	associated	with	command	and	control;	
the	need	to	ensure	survivability	of	the	ship	and	its	
weapons,	both	in	port	and	at	sea;	and	the	
challenges	of	developing	and	exercising	concepts	
of	operations	that	integrate	SBSD	into	the	
conventional	navy	and	into	Pakistan’s	larger	
strategic	deterrence	force	posture.		
Participants	also	proposed	additional	topics	that	
were	touched	on	but	for	reasons	of	time	could	not	
be	fully	explored	in	this	event.	These	could	include	
technological	and	operational	issues,	such	as	
greater	attention	to	the	role	of	naval	air,	changes	in	anti-submarine	warfare,	and	emerging	
unmanned	technologies.	On	the	political	and	strategic	front,	participants	evinced	interest	in	
discussing	the	challenges	of	signaling	and	avoiding	misunderstandings	related	to	SBSD;	the	
growing	importance	of	cyber,	information,	and	economic	warfare;	and	how	to	integrate	a	
multiplicity	of	delivery	systems	and	an	ambiguous	doctrine	into	a	deterrent	posture	that	is	
credible	to	India.	
Both	sides	also	expressed	interest	in	continuing	to	discuss	changes	to	the	geostrategic	
environment	of	the	Indian	Ocean	Region.	This	event	was	held	before	the	U.S.	election;	as	
such,	it	was	not	clear	at	the	time	how	or	whether	U.S.	policies	toward	Pakistan,	India,	China,	
and	Russia	would	evolve	under	a	new	administration.	This	Track	2	has	the	potential	to	
serve	an	important	role	in	maintaining	the	historically	positive	relationship	between	the	
Pakistan	Navy	and	the	United	States	Navy.		
Future	NCA	decision-
making	in	Pakistan	will	
likely	need	to	incorporate	
inputs	from	the	Navy	in	
order	to	integrate	
command	and	control,	
determine	target	selection,	
and	manage	other	
requirements	of	nuclear	
weapons	deployed	at	sea.		
